The empirical evidence of the e¤ect of intergenerational coresidence by elderly parents and their adult children on parental health remains inconclusive. This study provides a new estimate of the coresidence e¤ect by addressing non-random selection and heterogeneity in the treatment e¤ect. Examination of Japanese data reveals: (i) an insigni…cant, negative average coresidence e¤ect; (ii) a signi…cant, negative coresidence e¤ect on the treated; and (iii) that parents with unmet care needs and limited resources, typically widowed, disabled mothers, are most likely to su¤er from a signi…cant, negative coresidence e¤ect. The results support the theory that coresidence may worsen elderly parents'health because care burdens on their adult children create disincentives for the parents to invest in longevity. The signi…cant heterogeneity
Introduction
According to the theory of health capital, individuals make health-related decisions taking their consequences into consideration. The expected marginal costs and bene…ts of health investments determine the optimal trajectory of one's future health and thereby determine one's demand for longevity (Grossman, 1972; Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990) . Various sources of bene…ts and costs of health investments have been discussed in the literature, but the presence of family members has rarely received attention. If elderly parents are altruistic toward their adult children, how does the presence of the latter a¤ect the parents'healthrelated decisions and demand for longevity? What if the parents have signi…cant health-care needs?
Intergenerational coresidence by elderly parents and their adult children is often formed to meet parental care needs and to provide family support for security in old age. It is di¢ -cult to cast doubt on the positive, vital role of coresidence with children. In aging societies, care and attention provided by adult children remains an important source of support in old age. While the demand for elderly care is growing at an unprecedented rate, around 80% of the hours of care are provided informally, with children providing 41% of all informal care in the U.S., 43% in the U.K., and 60% in Japan (OECD, 2005) . In Japan, informal care provided by children often coincides with parent-child coresidence (The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2008) . However, despite the fact that the importance of informal care is widely recognized, despite the widespread notion that coresiding children are caregivers who provide comprehensive assistance to elderly parents, and despite numerous studies of the coresidence e¤ect by researchers in the …elds of sociology, demography, and gerontology, the empirical literature has yet to reach a consensus on the causal e¤ect of coresidence with an adult child on parental health.
A better understanding of the coresidence e¤ect has important implications for agedcare policies. As aging societies are pushing a growing number of frail old individuals into needing care, securing quality aged care has become a priority for governments. Given that care and attention provided by adult children still plays a major role, long-term care policies need to develop a well-balanced, e¤ective use of formal and informal care. On the other hand, many other countries have programs that support family caregivers such as respite care (OECD, 2013) . To assist evidence-based policy decisions, there exist many reliable evidences on the "costs and bene…ts" of formal and informal care, except for the "bene…t" of informal care. The burden of informal caregiving borne by carers is widely documented. Caregiving may signi…cantly a¤ect their labor-supply decisions (Ettner, 1995; Carmichael et al., 2010; Heitmueller, 2007; Sugawara and Nakamura, 2014) and their quality of life (Fast et al., 1999; Hall et al., 2014; Kenny et al., 2010) . Research on the quality measurement of formal care is also developing signi…cantly (OECD, 2013).
Thus the solid evidence of the e¤ectiveness of informal care is an important remaining element necessary to enhance aged-care programs.
Two questions are posed in this study. First, is the coresidence e¤ect indeed posi-tive? The literature on the coresidence e¤ect has so far paid limited attention to the non-experimental nature of data, and this may account for the mixed results. This study aims to provide a rigorous causal estimate by capitalizing on the program evaluation literature. In my setup, coresidence by an elderly parent and an adult child is referred to as the "treatment." The treatment group consists of elderly parents who live with an adult child and the control group consists of elderly parents who do not coreside with an adult child.
Second, how do we explain the sign of the coresidence e¤ect? Since one important reason for coresidence is certainly to meet a parent's care needs, one would expect to …nd incontrovertible evidence of its positive e¤ect in the literature. In this study, I propose a theory of health transfer as to why intergenerational coresidence may a¤ect parental health negatively, and test predictions derived from the theory utilizing a structural econometric model. I argue that coresidence may cause parents with serious care needs to be concerned that prolonging their own lives means placing an additional burden on their adult children.
This concern creates disincentives to invest in their health. For parents without serious care needs, on the other hand, coresidence creates incentives to remain healthy and thus delay the onset of potential caregiving burdens on coresiding children. This theory thus predicts a negative relationship between parents'care needs and the coresidence e¤ect.
Two econometric issues may have biased the results of previous studies. First, there may exist non-random selection into coresidence, especially selection by unobservable factors: that is, the possibility that the treated group is systematically di¤erent from the control group, even after observable characteristics are controlled for. For instance, suppose that sociable parents are more likely to coreside with children than unsociable ones. If an econometrician does not observe their sociability and if sociability contributes to future health, the estimate of coresidence e¤ect su¤ers from upward bias. This potential bias has been largely overlooked in the existing literature. Second, given the considerable heterogeneity in the motives and behavior of families, it is reasonable to suspect that the coresidence e¤ect would vary with various observable and unobservable family characteristics. Suppose that di¤erent families experience di¤erent coresidence e¤ects but the distribution of the coresidence e¤ect centers around zero. Then the resulting overall e¤ect averages zero, and, without a heterogeneous treatment e¤ect framework, an econometrician will incorrectly conclude that coresidence has no e¤ect. To address non-random selection into coresidence and heterogeneity in the coresidence e¤ect, I employ a factor structure model. I use the Nihon University Japanese Longitudinal Study of Aging (NUJLSOA), a nationally representative panel survey of elderly Japanese. Japanese culture, which features the close family ties found throughout East Asian societies, maintains one of the highest intergenerational coresidence rates among developed countries, thus providing an ideal setting for this study. The population in the analysis consists of elderly Japanese who have at least one adult child in the base year, 2003. The dependent variable is the parent's health outcome three years later constructed from the mortality status and a self-assessed health score. This combination of mortality and self-reported health allows me to fully exploit information in these two variables and avoid truncation and attrition bias due to death. I use the parent's region of residence (rural or not), the land price in the region of residence, and whether the parent lived in a rural area in childhood as instruments to address the issue of non-random selection into coresidence, arguing that these are valid instruments for the time period under consideration.
The main results are as follows. First, the point estimate of the average treatment e¤ect of coresidence on the three-year survival rate is 0:0184 with a standard error of 0.0133. If coresidence is randomly assigned, the three-year survival rate of elderly parents decreases by 1.84 percentage points on average. Although the estimate is not statistically signi…cant, the e¤ect is not greater than +1.0 percentage points at the 95% con…dence level; thus there is no evidence of a positive coresidence e¤ect. Second, the estimated average treatment e¤ect on the treated is statistically signi…cant, negative, and substantial. The three year survival rate of elderly parents in coresidence would be 5.32 percentage points higher (1.75 percentage point per annum) if they lived independently. Third, the results are consistent with the theory of health transfer: all else being equal, the coresidence e¤ect is negatively associated with coresidence burdens. Vulnerable parents with serious care needs but without the means to make …nancial compensation, typically mothers who are widowed and disabled, are most likely to be in coresidence and su¤er from a substantial negative coresidence e¤ect. The signi…cant heterogeneity in the coresidence e¤ect even after the introduction of the Long-Term Care Insurance suggests potential scope for a better targeted long-term care program in Japan.
Mixed Findings on the E¤ect of Coresidence
Researchers in di¤erent …elds have studied the e¤ect of living arrangements on the health of the elderly. These studies cover both Western and Asian countries and look at various populations and various health outcomes. Most of the studies undertaken prior to the year of 2000 rely on a cross-sectional approach, and hence su¤er from potential reverse causation -the possibility that coresidence occurs in response to declining parental health. Recently, the use of panel data has become standard. Table 1 summarizes recent studies as well as some early panel studies. Their …ndings are mixed and it is di¢ cult to draw a general conclusion. For example, Li et al. (2009) study the oldest old in China and …nd that whereas having a spouse in the household provides the best health protection, the e¤ect of living with adult children is mixed. Similar results are found for the mental health of elderly parents in Singapore (Chan et al., 2011) . Using data from Israel, Walter-Ginzburg et al. (2002) …nd that elderly parents who live with a child have a higher mortality risk than those living alone. In Japan, the risk of heart disease among elderly mothers who coreside with children is twice as high as the risk for those who do not (Ikeda et al., 2009) , and those elderly parents cared for by daughters are found to have a higher mortality rate than those cared for by a spouse (Nishi et al., 2010) .
To the best of my knowledge, Do and Malhotra (2012) and are the only studies that attempt to correct for non-random selection into coresidence. Do and Malhotra (2012) use the number of sons as an instrument, arguing that the instrument is related to traditional rules of coresidence and should not directly a¤ect parental health in the Korean setting. They …nd that living with a child reduces depressive symptoms among South Korean widowed elderly mothers. apply the econometric model presented in this study to parents 60 years of age and older in Indonesia. Using community level traditions and customs as instruments, they …nd a signi…cant, negative coresidence e¤ect on the treated.
[Insert Table 1 ] 3 Empirical Model
Latent Health Model with Heterogeneous Treatment E¤ects
To estimate the coresidence e¤ect and address non-random selection and heterogeneity in the coresidence e¤ect, I extend the factor-structure framework of Aakvik, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2005) (henceforth AHV), which provides a ‡exible yet parsimonious and tractable speci…cation that yields easily interpretable expressions for treatment parameters. The original AHV model simultaneously estimates three binary equations, for (1) selection, (2) treated outcomes, and (3) Because all dependent variables are discrete, a latent-index framework is used. The coresidence equation is speci…ed as
where Z i is a vector of observed characteristics (including the baseline health) that in ‡u-ence the family's coresidence decision, D is a vector of associated parameters, and U Di captures unobserved costs of coresidence. The latent variable, D i , measures the net utility of coresidence.
The health outcomes, Y ji ; j = 0; 1, are speci…ed as follows:
where X i is a vector of observed baseline characteristics, j denotes its associated parame- Following AHV, the error terms in equations (1) and (2) are assumed to be governed by the following normal factor structure:
where each of ; " D ; " 0 ; and " 1 follows the i.i.d. standard normal. 2 This speci…cation implies
Estimation relies on the maximum-likelihood method. The likelihood function has the
where
and denotes the standard-normal probability density function. To integrate i , numerical approximation by Gauss-Hermite quadrature is used.
Treatment Parameters
An advantage of the factor structure model is that the average treatment parameters and the distributions of the treatment parameters can be obtained from the estimated structural parameters. Let denote the treatment e¤ect with regard to survival for a given parent:
Note that includes a counterfactual and is not observed for each individual. The parameters of interests are: (i) the average treatment e¤ect (AT E);
(ii) the average treatment e¤ects on the treated (AT T ) and on the untreated (AT U ); and (iii) the marginal e¤ect of covariate X k on the AT E. Parameters (i)-(ii) measure the average value of on di¤erent conditioning sets. The AT E is the average e¤ect of coresidence for a parent chosen at random from the population. The AT E given a value of X is de…ned as
The AT T and AT U measure the average e¤ects for a parent who is in coresidence and for a parent who is not in coresidence, respectively, and are de…ned as
The AT T is the parameter most commonly estimated in literature. The marginal e¤ect of observed characteristics on the AT E, (iii), tells us how the coresidence e¤ect varies across observed characteristics. It is informative in inferring the mechanism underlying the causal e¤ect.
To obtain the estimates of these (unconditional) treatment parameters, I integrate estimated treatment parameters against the empirical distribution of X and Z. Standard errors are computed using the delta method. Table 1 in provides the summary of these treatment parameters.
Data
The data are derived from the Nihon University Japanese Longitudinal Study of Aging (NUJLSOA), a nationally representative survey of the population 65 years of age and older. 3 The analyses in this study use the latest two waves: the third and fourth waves, [Insert Table 2 ] Table 2 de…nes the variables used in this study. The dependent variable, Table 3 shows the distribution of the health outcome. The distribution centers around "3: Average" with a signi…cant mass in the death category. The three-year mortality rate is 10.0 percent in the sample, or 3.23 percent per annum. 5 Comparison of the distributions of the non-coresidence and coresidence groups shows that coresidence is associated with a lower survival rate. Such negative association can be observed if parents with worse health conditions are more likely to be in coresidence. The bottom half of Table 3 shows a moderate negative association between the baseline health and coresidence, indicating the importance of controlling for the baseline health.
[Insert Table 3 ] Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for the other variables used in this study. Variables from Spouse to Community activity are individual-level characteristics of each survey respondent. The other variables in Table 4 are de…ned for each elderly couple instead of each individual respondent, if the respondent is married. The variable, ADL Disability, is constructed as the …rst factor from a factor analysis of seven basic activities-of-dailyliving (ADL) items based on the 3,023 parent observations. Its mean value and standard deviation are roughly zero and one, respectively, and it takes a larger value when a parent is more severely disabled. All three child variables used in this study are de…ned at the parent level. We do not use the information on each child because our empirical framework abstracts the choice of which child to live with. Modeling multiple treatments makes the identi…cation of causal e¤ect infeasible.
[Insert Table 4] The last three variables, Rural, Land price, and Origin rural, are the instrumental variables (IVs) used to address non-random selection into coresidence. The land price is constructed from a government source as an average price of residential properties sampled in each municipal area. The logic behind these IVs is that the regional background and the rurality and average land prices of current location are not likely to directly a¤ect the health outcome of elderly parents when other covariates are held constant, but they do a¤ect the coresidence decision by changing preferences over coresidence and the setup and maintenance costs of coresidence. The last three rows in Table 4 show that compared with parents living without children, parents living with a child are more likely to be from the countryside and currently in rural areas with lower land prices. As can be seen below, these IVs are indeed strongly correlated with coresidence. In cities with high land prices, intergenerational coresidence appears expensive to set up and maintain, perhaps requiring a larger house. 6 At the same time, it is also reasonable to assume the exogeneity of my IVs in the Japanese context. Certainly those who live in urban areas and rural areas are likely to be di¤erent, e.g., in terms of income, education, and lifestyle; likewise, those with a rural background and those without a rural background may be systematically di¤erent; and land prices may re ‡ect how livable those areas are. Through these channels my IVs are
likely to be correlated with health outcomes unconditionally in the long run. However, the exogeneity condition necessary in this study is that when controlling for the base-year health and other observable characteristics, the IVs are unrelated to the three-year health outcome. All else being equal, it is unlikely that the location choice and the regional background make a signi…cant di¤erence to the three-year mortality. Providing further support for this argument is the fact that universal access to healthcare services is virtually guaranteed in Japan; elderly individuals are enrolled in the public health insurance and long-term-care insurance, which provide coverage to the elderly at a modest fee. Although the accessibility issue exists in some remote areas (e.g., remote islands), such remote and sparsely populated areas are not included in the data. One might also argue that the land price re ‡ects the lifetime earnings and other unobserved attributes of the elderly who live in that area. However, this relationship is weak for this generation in Japan. The variance in land prices rose dramatically in the 1980s, providing some landowners with huge windfall capital gains. As a result, although current land prices indicate the cost of starting and maintaining coresidence, they are far less correlated with the prices at which these individuals purchased their land. Similarly, one may argue that a correlation between the time trends in health and land prices may exist even when baseline health is controlled for and thus may a¤ect the validity of the instrument, but in Japan this will not be a major concern for the same reason. In addition, I conduct several statistical tests, and, as shown in the next section, the results con…rm the appropriateness of my instruments.
Results

Linear Regressions and Instrument Validity
Before reporting the results of the full structural model, I discuss results from simple linear models to highlight the nature of the data. Table 5 reports three simple estimates of the coresidence e¤ect: (1) the unconditional average e¤ect; (2) the average e¤ect from a linear probability model (LPM); and (3) the average e¤ect from an LPM with the IVs.
The unconditional average e¤ect shows that the three-year mortality rate for parents in coresidence is 3.6 percentage points higher than it is for those who have a child but live independently. This di¤erence is statistically signi…cant at the 1 percent level. This estimate, however, may capture the systematic di¤erence between the two groups rather than causal coresidence e¤ect. In the LPM model in the next column, baseline covariates allow us to control for the observable di¤erences between the two groups. The IV-LPM model in the last column controls for selection on both observables and unobservables. In neither model is the estimate of the coresidence e¤ect statistically signi…cant.
[Insert Table 5] A number of tests con…rm the appropriateness of the instruments. First, in the …rst-stage regression of the IV-LPM model in Table 5 , the three IVs are jointly signi…cant, each with a t-statistic of 3.37, 2.38, and 3.05, respectively. They are thus strong predictors of coresidence. Second, the overidenti…cation test supports the validity of the IVs: the P -value of the test based on the Hansen J-statistic is 0.675. 7 The validity of the IVs can also be tested by a "placebo test" in which I regress the three-year survival rate on the IVs and the same covariates used in the main analysis using childless elderly individuals. If intergenerational coresidence is the only channel through which the IVs potentially a¤ect health outcomes, the IVs must have no signi…cance in the health-outcome regression for those who do not have children. 
Estimated Coe¢ cients
The full model estimates the coresidence equation, (1) , and the two health-outcome equations, (2), simultaneously. Table 7 reports the coe¢ cient estimates of the coresidence equa- 7 Since the dependent variable is binary, I report statistics robust to heteroskedasticity.
tion, and Table 8 reports the coe¢ cient estimates of the two health-outcome equations for the non-coresidence and coresidence states.
The results of the coresidence equation con…rm the presence of non-random selection into coresidence. A parent is more likely to be in coresidence with a child if the parent is a¤ected by conditions that require family support, such as widowhood, limitations in daily activities, and dementia, whereas the results also show that parents with poor health and low subjective happiness are less likely to be in coresidence. Parents are also more likely to coreside with a child when they are working, less educated, and a parent of more children.
Parents who own a house are less likely to be in coresidence. This is inconsistent with common …ndings in the literature (Maruyama and Johar, 2013) , probably re ‡ecting inter vivos transfer frequently observed in Japan: house ownership is often transferred to a child in coresidence rather early and houses for coresidence are often purchased with substantial …nancial assistance from parents (Tabuchi, 2008; . Interpretation of the coe¢ cient estimates in the coresidence equation, however, requires caution because this equation does not address unobserved heterogeneity and therefore captures only statistical association rather than causal relationship. The results also con…rm the signi…cance of the instruments. Living in an urban area with a higher land price is associated with higher costs of coresidence, which signi…cantly reduces the probability of coresidence. The rural background, on the other hand, increases the probability of coresidence. This signi…cance of the IVs in the selection equation contrasts with their weak explanatory power in the "placebo" regression for childless elderly individuals (Table 6 ).
[Insert Table 7] The results of the two health-outcome equations are reported in Table 8 . Although some coe¢ cients vary considerably between the two health equations, many estimated coe¢ cients are consistent between the two equations and show expected signs. Parents who have better health outcomes after three years tend to be younger parents with a job, better base-period health, and a higher level of subjective happiness. Better health outcomes are also expected for those who manifest fewer symptoms of depression and are more involved in community activities. The table also reports the estimates of four cuto¤ points for the …ve discrete subjective-health outcomes (c 1 ; c 2 ; c 3 ; c 4 ). These thresholds are relative to the threshold for death, normalized at 0.
The factor structure parameter, , enters the health outcome equations with the coe¢ cient parameters, 0 and 1 . Note that a model with no selection on unobservables implies 0 = 1 = 0. As shown in the …rst row in Table 8 , the estimates of 0 and 1 are statistically signi…cant at the 1% con…dence level. Thus the null hypothesis of no selection bias due to unobservables is rejected and the reported one-factor model is the preferred speci…cation.
[Insert Table 8 ]
Treatment Parameters and Selection on Unobservables
The estimated treatment parameters are reported in Table 9 . The AT E is estimated to be 0:0184, implying that if coresidence with a child is randomly assigned to elderly parents, the three-year mortality rate increases by 1.84 percentage points on average. The standard error of 0.013 indicates that although the AT E estimate is not statistically signi…cant, the e¤ect is not greater than +1.0 percent at the 95% con…dence level; intergenerational coresidence is therefore unlikely to have a substantial positive e¤ect. The next three rows in Table 9 show distributional parameters of the AT E. I compute the distributional parameter, Pr ( = 1jX) Pr (Y 1 1; Y 0 = 0jx). Pr ( = 0jX) and Pr ( = 1jX) are de…ned in the same manner. The results reveal that if coresidence were randomly assigned to elderly parents, 89.9% would not be a¤ected by coresidence, 4.1% would avoid death because of coresidence, and 6.0% would die because of coresidence.
[Insert Table 9] This picture changes radically when we look at the treatment e¤ect on the treated. The
AT T is estimated to be 0:0532 and is signi…cant at the 1 percent level. This estimate implies that if parents in coresidence had not lived with children, their three-year survival rate would have been 5.32 percentage points higher (or 1.75 percentage points per annum).
Thus families with a potentially negative coresidence e¤ect tend to self-select into coresidence. Re ‡ecting the heterogeneity in the coresidence e¤ect, the AT U is estimated to be 0.0349.
Robustness of Results
In Table 10 I compare AT Es estimated by di¤erent speci…cations: (1) the unconditional average coresidence e¤ect; (2) an LPM, in which I impose a constant treatment e¤ect assuming no selection on unobservables; (3) an IV-LPM that allows selection on unobservables; (4) a binary probit model that assumes heterogeneity in the treatment e¤ect and no selection on unobservables; (5) a binary factor structure model that assumes heterogeneity in the treatment e¤ect and selection on unobservables; (6) an ordered probit model that assumes heterogeneity in the treatment e¤ect and no selection on unobservables; and (7) an ordered factor structure model that assumes heterogeneity in the treatment e¤ect and selection on unobservables (the preferred full model). The results show that addressing non-random selection on unobservables leads to greater negative treatment e¤ects, indicating positive selection on unobservables. Adding the ordered categorical structure produces more precise estimates. Both facts support the use of the full model (7). The comparison also indicates that the coresidence e¤ect is unlikely to be substantially positive.
[Insert Table 10] I also conduct a simple goodness-of-…t test. Using 4,000 Monte Carlo simulation draws of ( ; " D ; " 0 ; " 1 ), I check to what extent the preferred model can correctly predict the coresidence status and health outcomes. The baseline speci…cation is an independent combination of a binary probit for coresidence and a standard ordered probit for health outcomes. This baseline model correctly predicts 15.6% of the observed data, whereas the full model (7) correctly predicts 15.8%. Thus the factor structure model is able to reproduce the observed data fairly well.
Why The Negative Coresidence E¤ect? The Theory of Health Transfer
The negative coresidence e¤ect on the treated may appear to contradict the widely accepted assumption that informal care is important and that coresiding children are caregivers who provide essential assistance to elderly parents. However, my results are not inconsistent with the existing literature, as the past …ndings have been quite mixed. Moreover, using the same econometric approach, Johar and Maruyama (2014) also …nd a substantial negative coresidence e¤ect on the treated, in spite of three major di¤erences from this study: (1) the data set is from Indonesia; (2) the parents and children used in the sample are younger;
and (3) the identi…cation relies on di¤erent instruments -traditions and customs.
In this section I propose a possible explanation based on the theory of demand for longevity as to why intergenerational coresidence may negatively a¤ect parental health.
I derive testable implications and test them by examining estimated marginal e¤ects of covariates on the AT E.
Theory of Health Transfer
Coresidence with a child may or may not bene…t parents. Coresidence entails not only informal healthcare but also domestic assistance, risk sharing, economy of scale, and (probably This structure creates a trade-o¤ for the parent regarding longevity, which is the central idea of the theory. Although additional years of life increase the lifetime utility of the parent, when she has care needs and lives with her child, the child incurs a coresidence burden and this disutility of the child provides the parent with a disincentive to make health investments through the channels of altruism and exchange.
First, parental altruism is likely to reduce the marginal bene…t of health investments, because the prolonged coresidence expected from health investments further burdens her child. Second, even if the parent is not altruistic, in order to maintain coresidence she must compensate the child (or "buy" coresidence) by providing …nancial transfers, by o¤ering time-related services, or by shortening the remainder of her life. This "exchange channel" also lowers the marginal bene…t of health investments because prolonging a life increases the implicit price of coresidence.
These disincentives to make health investments may generate a negative coresidence e¤ect. If the expected lifetime utility gain from coresidence is su¢ ciently large, the parent may prefer to live with her child by sacri…cing her life expectancy to lessen the child's burden.
The idea of a rational decision in regard to the trade-o¤ between longevity and quality of life dates back to the health capital model proposed by Grossman (1972) , in which individuals choose the utility-maximizing allocation of time and wealth, considering the marginal bene…ts and costs of health investments over the course of their lifetime, ultimately choosing the optimal date of death.
The literature on resource allocation within families also dates back to the 1970s. The studies by Barro (1974) and Becker (1974) show that altruistically linked families pool their resources, and public transfers across generations are neutralized by within-family transfers (the Ricardian equivalence). 8 The literature has since discussed various parental motives behind the intergenerational …nancial transfers that parents make to their children in the form of bequests and inter vivos transfers. According to the exchange hypothesis, nonaltruistic parents may "buy" time-related services, such as informal care, by compensating their children's disutility with additional resource transfers (Bernheim et al., 1985; Cox, 1987) . I contribute to this literature by emphasizing the role of parental health as a medium of intergenerational transfers.
Testable Implications
In the discussion so far, I have provided an explanation as to why elderly parents who live with their children may not "choose" longer lives, pointing out the trade-o¤ in the demand for longevity. If the parental decision is governed by altruism or an exchange motive, parents in coresidence have limited incentives to live for a long time. This theory serves as a possible explanation if we empirically observe a negative coresidence e¤ect. In the rest of this section, using an informal comparative-statics argument, I derive testable implications that allow me to test the plausibility of the theory of health transfer.
Coresidence Burdens The parent's trade-o¤ hinges on the child's utility cost, which is the per-period coresidence burden multiplied by the expected length of coresidence. This implies that a larger per-period burden will lead to a worse coresidence e¤ect because of the larger marginal costs of additional years of life.
Prediction 1 All else equal, a larger per-period coresidence burden leads to a worse coresidence e¤ect on parental health.
In reality, the per-period caregiving burden is not a constant; disability and care burdens increase over time, often together with a decline in health. Thus reduced health investments may increase these burdens, and parents may have a greater incentive to maintain their health, to reduce future burdens on children. Although this introduces ambiguity into the theoretical prediction of the coresidence e¤ect, under mild assumptions, 9 elderly parents with no care needs have a greater incentive than those with disabilities to remain healthy so that they can delay the outset of caregiving burdens, whereas a severe disability creates a disincentive to make health investments. Therefore, even if the per-period burden changes over time, a larger per-period burden is likely to lead to a worse coresidence e¤ect.
To test this prediction, I look at widowhood and disability as measured by activities of daily living. Once other health status variables are controlled for, these variables should capture the extent of the burden that coresidence imposes on children. Marital status matters because a spouse provides care and attention, often as the primary caregiver. If the estimated coresidence e¤ect worsens with these coresidence burden measures, the data support the theory.
Opportunity Costs for Children By the same token, the health reduction is expected to increase with the child's opportunity cost. If the parent is altruistic, a reduction in the child's utility means a reduction in the parent's utility as well. Alternatively, a higher opportunity cost implies that the coresidence burden is more likely to exceed the child's tolerance threshold. In either case, when the child who provides care has other more important preoccupations, such as work opportunities in distant cities, the parent's incentive to make health investments is dampened.
Prediction 2 All else equal, the larger the per-period opportunity cost for the child, the greater the negative coresidence e¤ect on parental health.
To test this prediction, because the data do not provide information on children's income or wages, I use (i) the age of the child, assuming that the opportunity cost is larger for younger children because compromise in their career development has a greater impact on their lifetime earnings than it does on those of older children; and (ii) the proportion of female children, assuming that the opportunity cost is smaller for daughters than for sons because their career opportunities are relatively limited (in Japan this discrepancy is particularly salient) and because women are more e¢ cient than men when it comes to providing informal care.
Wealth The theoretical prediction regarding parental wealth is ambiguous. On one hand, instead of rewarding their children by means of health transfers, wealthy parents can do so by means of …nancial transfers (the King Lear e¤ect in Bernheim et al., 1985) . This is plausible because for elderly individuals the marginal utility of consumption is small relative to the marginal utility of life expectancy (Ehrlich and Chuma, 1990) . Consequently, wealthy parents will not need to compromise their longevity and will enjoy a better coresidence e¤ect.
On the other hand, a longer life eats up parental wealth and reduces the amount of bequest transfers. Children of wealthy parents can receive larger transfers if their parents die earlier (the Prince Hal situation in Goody, 1987) . Hence the possible bequest transfers amplify the trade-o¤ of altruistic parents, and the amount of parental wealth may be negatively correlated with the coresidence e¤ect.
Because the data provide no direct measure of wealth, I examine how the coresidence e¤ect varies with proxies for parental wealth: parents'education, housing asset, and income.
Bargaining If a family is not (strongly) altruistically linked, the number of children in the family a¤ects the bargaining power of the parent. Speci…cally, parents with fewer children will have less bargaining power and will need to reduce their longevity to a greater extent. An only child has the greatest bargaining power and the parent faces the highest implicit price for coresidence. This hypothesis can be tested by the number of children.
Prediction 3 All else equal, when intergenerational family bargaining dominates family altruism, a parent with fewer children experiences a worse coresidence e¤ect.
Note that if a family is predominantly altruistically linked, Prediction 3 may not hold, but the theory can still explain a negative coresidence e¤ect and Predictions 1 and 2 may still hold.
Marginal E¤ects on ATE and Testing Theory Predictions
Not only unobservable but also observable characteristics generate heterogeneity in the coresidence e¤ect. The relationship between the observables and the coresidence e¤ect allows us to test the theory predictions and infer the mechanism underlying the coresidence e¤ect. Table 11 reports the calculated marginal e¤ects of the observed characteristics on the AT E. Parents who experience a worse coresidence e¤ect tend to be widowed mothers who are a-icted with ADL limitations, depression-related symptoms, and dementia. They also tend to be not involved in household …nancial management and have younger sons.
The marginal e¤ects of observed characteristics can also be estimated for a model with no selection on unobservables (i.e. 0 = 1 = 0). The marginal e¤ects estimated with this restricted model show largely consistent magnitudes and signi…cance, implying that the discussion in this subsection does not depend on the choice of my instruments.
[Insert Table 11 ]
Are these observations consistent with the theory's predictions? The …rst prediction, regarding the care burden, is supported by the signi…cant, negative relationship between daily-activity limitations and the AT E. Although disability is closely related to the future health outcome in general, this negative relationship is observed even when the other baseline health characteristics are controlled for. In contrast, the subjective-health dummies and the cancer dummy indicate no signi…cant impact on the AT E. These variables are more closely related to health and remaining years of life. What matters in regard to the consequences of coresidence is therefore the burden of caregiving on coresiding children, not parental health conditions. 10 In addition, the estimated coe¢ cient on Spouse also con…rms the …rst prediction: widowed parents tend to experience a worse coresidence e¤ect. The second prediction about the lifetime opportunity costs for the child is also supported by the positive coe¢ cient on the child's age (where the parent's age is controlled for). The child's higher marginal utility of time provides the parent with a disincentive to make health investments. The positive and signi…cant coe¢ cient on the ratio of female children also supports the health-transfer theory, although this is also consistent with the widespread notion that women are better caregivers than men.
I …nd no de…nitive evidence that wealth has a protective e¤ect. The estimates of income and working status are insigni…cant, perhaps because they are not suitable proxies for the wealth of the elderly: the house asset constitutes a large portion of their wealth especially in Japan. The estimated coe¢ cient on house ownership has an expected sign, suggesting that those who own a house do not need to sacri…ce their health, but its t-value is only 1.42. The variable income missing exhibits a negative and signi…cant estimate, indicating that parents who did not provide their approximate income level in the survey may have very limited transferable wealth or limited control over family wealth. This is a …nding consistent with the theory. Regarding the third prediction about family bargaining, the number of children is negative and signi…cant. This …nding contradicts the family-bargaining hypothesis and suggests that the negative coresidence e¤ect is due to parental altruism.
It is thus reasonable to conclude that elderly parents who tend to su¤er from a substantial negative impact from coresidence are those who expect to rely signi…cantly on their children without the means to make …nancial compensation as a quid pro quo.
Indirect support for the health-transfer hypothesis is also found in many Japanese survey studies. A survey of over 2,000 Japanese Long (2006) discusses, it is a widely accepted notion that an ideal death is a death that is peaceful, painless, and sudden, lest it impose caregiving burdens on others. Another survey based on the Japanese over 40 years of age, …nds that more than 60% of the respondents prefer such sudden death and that one of the major reasons for this preference is to avoid imposing care burdens on their families (Kotani, 2004 ).
Alternative Explanations
Abuse and Neglect A negative coresidence e¤ect is also consistent with abuse and neglect of elders. Nishi et al. (2010) …nd that Japanese women cared for by their daughtersin-law have a lower survival rate than those dependent on any other category of caregiver, and propose that abuse and neglect are the most likely cause. Lachs et al. (1998) report that elderly Americans who experienced abuse were 3.1 times more likely to die during a 3-year period than those who were not mistreated, and in Japan, the majority of perpetrators are daughters-in-law (Soeda and Araki, 1999).
Although abuse and neglect are not uncommon in Japan and thus appear to be responsible for a part of the negative coresidence e¤ect, they are unlikely to be the driving force behind the negative coresidence e¤ect for the following reasons. First, if a child has a means to undermine parental health and chooses to do so, the expected return on such conduct should increase with the parent's wealth. In Japanese civil law, the decedent's next of kin have a legal right to a statutory fraction, or legitim, of the decedent's gross estate and cannot be disinherited. However, the signs of the estimated marginal e¤ects of wealth-related variables in Table 11 are not consistent with this theoretical prediction. Second, such a bad relationship cannot explain the formation of coresidence. It is natural to assume that families make the coresidence decisions on the basis of the expected costs and bene…ts, and a good relationship should contribute to the bene…t of coresidence. 11 Third, although it is natural to presume that abuse and neglect are associated with the elderly parent's lower life satisfaction, the subjective happiness index shows no marginal e¤ect on the AT E in Table 11 .
Exposure to Microbes and Viruses Coresidence may negatively a¤ect parental health through a greater exposure to microbes and viruses. To determine whether this is the driving force behind the negative coresidence e¤ect, I estimate a model to which I add another covariate, the proportion of children in bad health among all the siblings as a proxy for the coresiding child's health. 12 This model yields an AT E and an AT T almost identical to those of the preferred model, and shows no relationship between the AT E and 11 Undoubtedly certain families initiate coresidence on the basis of biased expectations or because they simply do not have other options, and daughters-in-law, particularly under Japanese virilocal traditions, may be forced to be the caregiver irrespective of their preferences. However, during my sample period, Japanese families are as mobile as those in other modern societies and exhibit a wide range of living arrangements, so it is reasonable to assume that the living arrangements observed in my data re ‡ect the preferences of the families rather than traditions and social norms. 12 In the NUJLSOA, a child is de…ned to be unhealthy if described by the parent as "not healthy enough to take care of someone". the health measure of children. 13 Another rebuttal to this hypothesis is the fact that the presence of a spouse has no signi…cant e¤ect on the respondent's health on average (Table   5) , whereas the hypothesis implies that married individuals are more likely to be exposed to viruses than are individuals living alone. Furthermore, the marginal e¤ect of the presence of a spouse on the AT E is positive and highly signi…cant (Table 11 ).
14 Access to Care As shown in Table 4 , parents living with children are on average poorer than parents living without children. One might therefore presume that because elderly parents in coresidence are on average poorer and cannot a¤ord access to health and nursing care, an econometrician observes a spurious negative relationship between coresidence and future health. This explanation is unlikely, however, to be valid in the case of Japan.
The Japanese health care system guarantees universal access, and during the sample years of this study, the out-of-pocket payments made by the elderly were quite small and the a¤ordability of health and nursing care was not a major issue. 15 In addition, because Japan introduced public long-term care insurance in April 2000, the a¤ordability of basic nursing assistance was not a major issue either. In the NUJLSOA, if a respondent is incapable of being interviewed, the interview may be conducted with a proxy, typically a family member in the household. This is another potential source of bias because seriously ill parents living alone are less likely to be observed in the data due to the absence of a proxy than are parents who are seriously ill but living with a child. Because this selection bias due to the lack of a proxy is relevant only in the case of parents living alone, I can con…rm that this possibility is not a major concern by estimating the coresidence e¤ect separately for married and unmarried parents (using the LPM and IV-LPM models in Table 5 ). In fact, the coresidence e¤ect of married couples proves to be somewhat more negative that of unmarried couples, although the di¤erence is not statistically signi…cant.
Conclusions
Although intergenerational coresidence is declining, it is still the most common living arrangement in the world (UN, 2005) , and many countries expect to rely on informal care from family members in the foreseeable future. In underdeveloped countries, approximately 75% of elderly persons live with a child. In European countries the average is about 25%, but the trend toward solitary living has slowed or halted in many countries.
In this study I …nd a statistically signi…cant, negative coresidence e¤ect on the treated.
Estimated heterogeneity in the treatment e¤ect suggests that vulnerable parents with serious care needs but without the means to make …nancial compensation are most likely to be in coresidence and to su¤er from a substantial negative impact of coresidence. These …nd-ings are consistent with the hypothesis that coresidence negatively a¤ects parental health by creating disincentives for parents to invest in their health when there is no means to make …nancial compensation as a quid pro quo.
Four policy implications are worth mentioning. First, policies that aim to directly a¤ect living arrangements need to be carefully designed. The Singaporean government, for example, has introduced housing tax incentives to promote intergenerational coresidence and to maintain the traditional social structure (Mehta et al., 1995) . My results raise a concern that such policies may result in an unintended adverse e¤ect on parental health. Many studies compare more than two living arrangements, in which case I report a treatment most relevant to this study. In this column "coresidence" means living with somebody.
b
The symbol + indicates a favorable impact on health, regardless of how a health measure is de…ned. 
